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11 Introduction
Commercial banks are changing with the rapid development of ￿nancial services. They are no longer only
lending institutions but they are becoming complex organisations involved more and more in the provision of
a set of related services, such as trusts, annuities, mutual funds, mortgage banking, insurance brokerage and
transaction services. According to Allen and Santomero (2001), banks have managed to develop new lines
of business to compensate for the decline in the traditional intermediation business both in Europe and in
the United States. Berger and Mester (2003) ￿nd that during the Nineties cost productivity in the banking
industry in the US worsened while pro￿t productivity improved substantially and explain this result by the
fact that US banks o⁄ered a wider variety of ￿nancial services. Also in Europe non interest income has been
the most dynamic component of banks￿income, which contributed signi￿cantly to the overall rise of banks￿
pro￿tability (ECB, 2005).
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) ￿nd evidence of a ￿a dark side of diversi￿cation￿ . According to the results of
their analysis, the observed shift toward activities generating fees, trading revenue, and other non interest
income has not improved the performance of US ￿nancial holding companies from 1997 to 2002. One of the
explanations proposed by the authors is that ￿nancial holding companies may have pointed to ￿cross selling￿
as a key strategic mean to lower costs, increase income and diversify revenue but selling many products to
the same customer has reduced potential diversi￿cation bene￿ts. Lepetit et al (2007) also ￿nd limited gains
from diversi￿cation for a large sample of European banks from 1996 to 2002. Furthermore they ￿nd evidence
that banks have used traditional lending activities as a ￿loss leader￿ : the price banks charge for loans is a
decreasing function of non interest income and particularly commission and fee income. They suggest that
banks tend to underprice credit risk as granting a long term loan increases the probability of actually selling
fee generating products to a core customer.
These results raise some concern on the traditional role of banks as producers of imperfect information
about borrowers. In particular we may ask what are the consequences of banks￿shift towards ￿nancial
services for their screening activity. While there is empirical evidence of increasing diversi￿cation in the
2banking sector, we are not aware of any theoretical model investigating its impact on the traditional role
of banks as providers of screening services. The ￿rst aim of this paper is to ￿ll this gap by analysing the
impact of cross-selling on banks￿screening incentives in the context of a spatial imperfect competition model
of the banking sector where we assume that positively evaluated loan applicants are more likely to buy other
services from their lending bank.
We de￿ne ￿cross-selling￿as a bundling strategy based on the assumption that, once a loan applicant gets
a loan, he becomes a warm customer, i.e. it becomes easier to sell to that customer other services di⁄erent
from loans. In the standard industrial organisation literature bundling can serve as a price discrimination
device either in a ￿pure bundling￿strategy, when the ￿rm sells two or more goods only in package, or in
a ￿mixed bundling￿strategy, when the ￿rm sells the same goods separately as well as packaged (Adams
and Yellen, 1976; Mc Afee, Mc Millan and Whinston, 1989). In the model of Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo
and Verdier (1995) ￿pure bundling￿between loans and deposits is not a price discrimination device but an
optimal strategy to get around the regulation.
In our model we have neither a ￿pure bundling￿strategy, since when the bank sells a loan to a customer
he is not obliged to buy other services, nor a true ￿mixed bundling￿strategy since services other than loans
are not sold separately. All the loans are packaged with other services that will be bought by the customer
with a positive probability so that the relationship with a borrower has a marketing value for the bank and
the bank must consider the cost of rejecting loan applicants when choosing the optimal level of the screening
e⁄ort. Under these assumptions we show that cross-selling has a negative impact on the optimal screening
e⁄ort. By reducing the proportion of information based credit, cross-selling has the same implication for the
screening activity of collateral in the model of lazy banks proposed by Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001)
and of credit rationing on monitoring in the model of Caminal and Matutes (2002).
The e⁄ect of cross-selling on screening incentives may be mitigated by the existence of relevant information
synergies between the di⁄erent activities performed by the bank. There are several theoretical and empirical
studies analysing information synergies among loans and deposits. Nakamura (1993) argues that the joint
provision of loans and deposits makes bank lending special by allowing the bank to learn from deposits
3about its borrowers. Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2007) provide detailed evidence of how a commercial
bank uses information about current accounts to determine its credit ratings of borrowers and adjust the
intensity of its monitoring activity. This literature demonstrates that selling services di⁄erent from loans
may decrease substantially bank￿ s screening costs. In our model information about the services bought by
a customer may lower banks￿screening costs and information collected about a potential borrower through
the screening activity may be used to increase the probability of selling him services other than loans.
The second aim of this article is to study the e⁄ect of a more competitive environment on the pro￿tability
of cross-selling. Could cross-selling be an optimal response to the increasing competition in the European
lending market caused by the progressive capital market liberalisation and the di⁄usion of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTs)?
In the literature we ￿nd several studies investigating the impact of more competition in the lending
market on relationship lending. A recent literature (Caminal and Matutes, 2002; Freixas, 2005) analyses
how competition in credit market may lower the optimal monitoring e⁄ort. Bank monitoring generates soft
information that allows parties to implement more e¢ cient outcomes. Since the ￿interim monitoring￿e⁄ort
(the e⁄ort that allows the bank to prevent the ￿rm from investing in ine¢ cient projects) increases with
the expected excess return on banks￿investment, more competition in the banking industry decreases the
monitoring e⁄ort. From an ex-ante perspective Gehrig (1998) shows that the relationship between the degree
of competition and the screening e⁄ort is ambiguous. Boot and Thakor (2000) and Yafeh and Yosha (2001)
demonstrate that, when competition increases, the pro￿tability of market ￿nance decreases more than that
of relationship loans so the bank is induced to increase ￿relationship￿lending at the expense of ￿transaction￿
lending.
In our model we show that, for su¢ ciently low levels of transportation costs, an increase in competi-
tion in the lending market increases the expected pro￿tability of services, thus increasing the incentive for
banks to engage in cross-selling activities. We can, therefore, also suggest another possible indirect e⁄ect
of competition on screening, via the increase in services, whose sign depends on the degree of information
synergies between screening and cross-selling. More competition increases the pro￿tability of services and
4more services induce the bank to perform less screening in the absence of information synergies. Overall the
results of our model on the impact of competition on cross-selling are consistent with the view that the shift
of banks towards non traditional activities can be the response to a more competitive banking industry.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic set-up of the model. Section 3 analyses
the impact of cross-selling on screening. Section 4 focuses on the e⁄ect of competition in the lending market
on the pro￿tability of cross-selling. Section 5 extends the model to the case of the existence of information
synergies between screening and selling services and analyses the empirical implications of the model; ￿nally
the last section draws the main conclusions of the paper.
2 The theoretical model
We analyse a spatial competition model of the banking sector where banks have the possibility to sell to
their customers other services di⁄erent from loans. In what follows we will present the basic set-up of the
model describing the assumptions on the borrower￿ s behaviour, the bank￿ s behaviour, the screening activity,
and the cross-selling activity.
Borrowers
We use a Salop model of spatial competition (Salop, 1979), so we consider an economy with a continuum
of potential risk neutral borrowers located uniformly (with density 1) around a unit circle, each having an
investment project to be ￿nanced with one unit of loanable funds that they can borrow from a bank. Each
borrower has a transportation cost ￿ > 0 for unit of length.
The project generates a random return y(z) which is characterised by a random binary variable y(z) 2
f0;zg. There are two types of projects, good and bad. The good project generates the positive outcome z
with probability ph while the bad project generates the positive outcome z with probability pl < ph: The
outcome z is borrowers￿private information and is ￿ large enough￿so that all borrowers, good and bad, will
always apply for loans at the prevailing interest rate (since borrowers are protected by limited liability, the
5participation constraint requires the net expected outcome to be larger than the transportation cost).
The proportion of good projects (for which z ￿ ph > rf , where rf is the risk-free interest rate) in the
population is ￿ 2 [0;1] and is common knowledge. Bad projects have a mean expected rate of return less
than the cost of loanable funds, so that z￿pl < rf (i.e. bad projects are dominated by the safe capital market
investment) and they are observationally indistinguishable from good ones without some screening activity.
Banks
There are n banks located around the unit circle and market power derives from transportation and
location costs. Each bank has a ￿xed cost of installation K. Banks are risk neutral and maximise their
expected pro￿ts. They have access to competitive capital markets, where they issue bonds at the risk free
interest rate rf.
Each bank may get some information on which of the projects is expected to fail by using a creditworthi-
ness test that we model following Devinney (1986) and Gehrig (1998). Each bank i must decide the optimal
screening e⁄ort, e￿
i and the optimal loan interest rate, r￿
i . Banks sell also services other than loans to loan
applicants.
The screening activity
Each bank￿ s screening activity can be described in terms of a creditworthiness test. Only borrowers that
pass the test get the loan. The bank observes noisy signals of the borrowers￿quality, good or bad, and the
signal characteristics correspond to the pool characteristics. The test imperfectly assigns ￿rms to one of the
two risk classes, respectively good and bad borrowers.
If e is the e⁄ort of the bank in the screening activity, we may de￿ne ￿(e) = prob(s = Gjtype = good) as the
probability of correctly observing a good signal where s 2 fB;Gg denotes the signal, (1 ￿ ￿(e)) = prob(s =
Bjtype = good) as the probability of erroneously observing a bad signal; ￿(e) = prob(s = Gjtype = bad)
as the probability of erroneously observing a good signal and (1 ￿ ￿(e)) = prob(s = Bjtype = bad) as the
probability of correctly observing a bad signal. We assume that banks accept borrowers when they observe
6a good signal and reject borrowers when they observe a bad signal (see table 1).
The higher is the per applicant e⁄ort e 2 [0;1] in the screening activity, the higher is the ability of the
bank to recognise good projects with ￿0(e) ￿ 0, ￿
0(e) ￿ 0, ￿00(e) ￿ 0, ￿
00(e) ￿ 0.
Since screening is costly the bank must choose the optimal level of e⁄ort given the screening cost C(e)
that we assume to be strictly convex with C0(e) > 0, C00(e) > 0, C(0) = 0, and lime!1 C0(e) = 1. This last
assumption implies that e = 1 will never be optimal for the bank.
We de￿ne A(e) = [￿(e)￿ + ￿(e)(1 ￿ ￿)] as the selection ratio (i.e. the percentage of loan applicants
that is positively evaluated by the bank). We will see that the properties of this ratio are important for
understanding the way in which cross-selling a⁄ects the optimal screening e⁄ort and lending. In particular we
will be interested in the e⁄ect of an increase in the screening e⁄ort on the selection ratio (the sign of A0(e)).
This depends on the proportion of good and bad projects in the population and on the properties of the
screening technology. The selection ratio increases with the screening e⁄ort whenever ￿0(e)￿ > ￿￿
0(e)(1￿￿)
and this is more likely the higher is the proportion of good projects in the population, the higher is the
marginal positive impact of the screening e⁄ort on the probability of correctly observing a good signal and
the lower is the marginal negative impact of screening on the probability of erroneously observing a bad
signal. Since there is no reason to expect a large di⁄erence between ￿0(e) and ￿
0(e) we will refer to good
(bad) periods when the selection ratio increases (decreases) with the screening e⁄ort. In fact we expect that
in good periods, i.e. when there is a high proportion of good projects in the population, the more accurate is
the screening activity the more likely it is that banks recognise truly good projects, thus increasing lending,
while the opposite is true in bad periods.
We also de￿ne B(e) = [￿(e)￿ph + ￿(e)(1 ￿ ￿)pl] as the expected ratio of successful projects (i.e. the
percentage of loan applicants, good and bad, that are positively evaluated and successful)1. We will see that
the sign of the impact of the interest rate on the screening e⁄ort will depend on the sign of the impact of
the screening e⁄ort on the expected ratio of successful projects (the sign of B0(e)).
1In the rest of the paper we will use indi⁄erently the terms "ratio" or "number" of successful projects. The term "ratio"
depends on the fact that we have normalised the population of potential borrowers to one.
7In good periods, since an increase in the screening e⁄ort increases the number of ￿nanced projects
(A0(e) > 0) it also increases the expected number of successful projects B0(e) > 0. In bad periods an
increase in the screening e⁄ort leads to a decrease in the number of ￿nanced projects and this can lead to
both an increase or a decrease in the expected number of successful projects depending on the degree of
heterogeneity between good and bad projects. In particular in bad periods with "enough" heterogeneity
among projects (A0(e) < 0 and B0(e) > 0)2 more screening leads to a lower number of ￿nanced projects but
to a higher expected number of successful projects, while in bad periods with "enough" homogeneity among
projects (A0(e) < 0 and B0(e) < 0) more screening leads to a lower number of ￿nanced projects and to a
lower expected number of successful projects. Finally we can introduce a measure of the expected quality
of the pool of ￿nanced projects Q(e) =
B(e)
A(e) (i.e. the expected share of successful projects over all ￿nanced
projects). In all states of the world an increase in the screening e⁄ort increases the expected quality of the




(ph ￿ pl)￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿0(e)￿(e) ￿ ￿
0(e)￿(e))
A(e)2 > 0:




￿￿0(e)(1￿￿) < 1. For given ￿, ￿0(e), and ￿0(e), this is more
likely to happen the higher is the di⁄erence in the success probability of good and bad projects. We therefore refer to bad
periods with enough heterogeneity among projects when A0(e) < 0 and B0(e) > 0 and to bad periods with enough homogeneity
among projects when A0(e) < 0 and B0(e) < 0.
8Table 1 The creditworthiness test
EVALUATIONnREALITY Good Bad
Good Correct False positive
Prob = ￿(e) Prob = ￿(e)
(type II error)
Bad False negative Correct
Prob = 1 ￿ ￿(e) Prob = 1 ￿ ￿(e)
(type I error)
The cross-selling activity
Each bank is a multiproduct ￿rm selling loans and a given number S of other services di⁄erent from
loans. For each service other than loan the bank pays ￿xed and variable costs. We assume that the variable
cost is negligible so that we can consider only the ￿xed cost that is included in the bank installation cost
K3. Firms that are not ￿nanced by banks, i.e. ￿rms borrowing from the capital market, buy services from
other suppliers. The banking system competes with other institutions (like insurance companies, investment
companies and so on) in the market for services. Since there are many specialised institutions selling services,
we assume that the bank is price taker in the service market and we denote the price of the service with vs.
We assume that the probability to sell a service to a customer, ps, is larger than the probability of selling
a service to a non-customer which, for simplicity, we normalise to zero. The expected revenue from selling
services for the bank is therefore equal to psvsS: We also assume that the revenue from services is not state
dependent (the borrower pays for services also in case of default out of the loan)4. Since we are interested
in studying the interaction between screening and cross-selling, we assume that the expected revenue from
3In this model services are exogenous. We can, therefore, imagine that the bank chooses ex ante how many services to sell
and incurs the ￿xed costs of organising the service activity. The ￿rst aim of the paper is to assess if banks having a di⁄erent
number of services to sell have di⁄erent screening incentives.
4We are aware that some ￿nancial services like, for example, underwriting activity are state contingent but this is not the
case for many other services.
9services is small enough that banks will never be willing to ￿nance bad projects: plz + psvsS < rf:5
The structure of the game
We study the following extensive form game: in the ￿rst stage banks maximise expected pro￿ts and
simultaneously set the equilibrium screening e⁄ort, e￿
i and interest rate, r￿
i ; in the second stage each ￿rm ap-
plies at exactly one bank; in the third stage banks screen loan applicants and extend credit at the announced
rate to positively evaluated borrowers or not at all.
3 The impact of cross-selling on the optimal screening e⁄ort
Assume that n banks located symmetrically around a circle have entered the market, if ri is the interest rate
o⁄ered to borrowers by a typical bank and r0 is the interest rate o⁄ered by its neighbour competitors (the
banks i+1 and i￿1), a borrower located at distance x 2 [0;1=n] from the bank i will be indi⁄erent between
bank i and bank i + 1 if:







where pj is ph for a good borrower and pl for a bad borrower. Since in the population there are ￿ good









where p = ￿ph+(1￿￿)pl: The lower is transportation cost for unit of length ￿, and the higher is the average
success probability p the higher is the sensitivity of demand to interest rate di⁄erentials.
We ￿rst characterize the symmetric equilibrium and then analyse the impact of services on the optimal
screening e⁄ort. The optimal screening e⁄ort of the bank, and the optimal loan interest rate depend on the
5Note that z >> ri is a necessary condition for the borrower￿ s participation constraint to be satis￿ed, therefore plz+psvsS <
rf is a su¢ cient condition for ensuring that the bank is not willing to ￿nance bad borrowers and, therefore, is induced to screen
loan applicants in order to reject bad borrowers.







(ri ￿ r0)][B(e)ri ￿ A(e)(rf ￿ psvsS) ￿ C(e)] ￿ K (3)
where:
A(e) ￿ [￿(e)￿ + ￿(e)(1 ￿ ￿)];
B(e) ￿ [￿(e)￿ph + ￿(e)(1 ￿ ￿)pl];
p ￿ [￿ph + (1 ￿ ￿)pl]:
Pro￿ts depend on both the lending and the cross-selling activities. The bank receives the interest rate
from successful borrowers while for all positively evaluated borrowers (good and bad) she pays the risk free
interest rate and she gets the revenue from services with a positive probability ps > 0.
Maximising (3) with respect to the screening e⁄ort and the interest rate we ￿nd the equilibrium values
of the two endogenous variables.
Proposition 1 The optimal level of e⁄ort e￿ in the symmetric equilibrium (for ri = r0) satis￿es:
1
n
[B0(e￿)r￿ ￿ A0(e￿)(rf ￿ psvsS) ￿ C0(e￿)] = 0 (4)
where B0(e)r ￿ A0(e)(rf ￿ psvsS) is the marginal expected bene￿t of screening and C0(e) is the marginal
cost of screening.











The equilibrium interest rate is increasing in the bank￿ s monopolistic power (i.e. total transportation costs
￿=n), it is decreasing in the average success probability, p (i.e. in the sensitivity of demand to interest rate
di⁄erentials), and, given the equilibrium screening e⁄ort, it is decreasing in the equilibrium mean expected
11project quality, B(e￿)=A(e￿), it is increasing in the equilibrium screening costs per successful borrower,
C(e￿)=B(e￿) and in the cost of loanable funds net of the expected revenue from services, rf ￿ psvsS. The





￿[B00(e￿)r￿ ￿ A00(e￿)(rf ￿ psvs) ￿ C00(e￿)]B(e￿) ￿ (￿=pn)[B0(e￿)]2 < 0 (6)
Corollary 1 Screening incentives are a decreasing function of the range of services (S) o⁄ered by the bank
Proof. See Appendix A
An increase in services has a direct impact on screening (see equation 4) and an indirect impact through the
equilibrium interest rate (see equation 5). The sign of the impact of services on the equilibrium screening
e⁄ort is the sign of the sum of these two e⁄ects (see a) and b) in Table 2). First, with more services banks
are induced to increase the selection ratio in order to increase the revenue from services and this might
lead to a higher or lower screening e⁄ort depending on how screening a⁄ects the selection ratio (the sign of
A0(e)). Since the impact of screening on the selection ratio is positive in good periods and negative in bad
periods, via this channel, banks are induced to increase the screening e⁄ort in good periods and to decrease
the screening e⁄ort in bad periods. Secondly, an increase in services, for a given screening e⁄ort, leads to a
decrease in the optimal lending rate since, when services increase, the net cost of loanable funds decreases
and each bank maximises pro￿ts with a lower interest rate. The impact of the change in the interest rate on
the equilibrium screening e⁄ort depends on how screening a⁄ects the expected ratio of successful projects
(the sign of B0(e)). When the expected ratio of successful projects increases with screening the lower interest
rate leads to a lower e⁄ort6, while when the expected ratio of successful projects decreases with screening the
6From equation 4 we can observe that when B0(e) > 0 the expected marginal bene￿t of screening increases with the interest
rate while when B0(e) < 0 the expected marginal bene￿t of screening decreases with the interest rate. This is because, since
only successfull projects pay the interest rate, an increase in the interest rate makes screening more pro￿table when the expected
ratio of successful projects increases with screening and vice versa.
12lower interest rate leads to a higher e⁄ort. However Corollary 1 states that the total impact of an increase
in services on the marginal expected bene￿t of screening and, therefore, on the equilibrium screening e⁄ort
is always negative. The intuition is that, with more services, since screening is costly while both good and
bad borrowers pay for services, the expected marginal bene￿t of screening decreases and the bank maximises
pro￿ts with a lower screening e⁄ort and a lower quality of the project pool.
Table 2 The impact of services on the equilibrium screening e⁄ort
CASES Partial e⁄ect Total e⁄ect
A0(e￿) > 0 a) S " A(e￿) " e￿ " b) prevails
B0(e￿) > 0 b)S " r￿ # e￿ #
A0(e￿) < 0 a) S " A(e￿) " e￿ # a) prevails
B0(e￿) < 0 b)S " r￿ # e￿ "
A0(e￿) < 0 a) S " A(e￿) " e￿ # a) and b) have
B0(e￿) > 0 b)S " r￿ # e￿ # the same sign
Corollary 2 For any given number of banks a decrease in transportation costs causes cross-selling to have
an even more negative e⁄ect on screening.
Proof. See equation 6.
Therefore more competition caused by more transparency, IT developments, etc. ampli￿es the negative
impact of cross-selling on screening.
Corollary 3 Services increase lending in bad periods and decrease lending in good periods.
Proof. In the symmetric equilibrium the total amount of loans ￿nanced by the banking system is A(e￿)









13When there are many bad (good) projects in the economy, services by decreasing the screening e⁄ort lead
to an increase (decrease) in the number of ￿nanced projects, and therefore on lending.
Overall the model predicts that with more cross-selling banks will spend less resources in the screening
activity. By using less accurate screening procedures they will be less able to distinguish good from bad
projects. As a consequence, in periods (places) in which there are many bad projects (e.g. recessions, more
risky environments) the less accurate screening activity will lead banks to increase lending while the opposite
will happen in good states of the world.
In all states of the world services, by decreasing the optimal screening e⁄ort, decrease the quality of the
pool of ￿nanced projects. We will see that this result may be reversed when we assume the existence of
relevant synergies between banks￿screening and cross-selling activities (Section 5).
4 The impact of competition in the lending market on the prof-
itability of cross-selling
So far we have studied the impact of services on screening for a given number of banks. Now we endogenize
entry and we study the impact of a change in transportation costs, interpreted as more competition between
existing players (banks), on the pro￿tability of the cross-selling activity. Capital market liberalisation and the
di⁄usion of ICTs in the banking sector in advanced industrial countries have led to an increase in competition
in the lending market. We ask whether cross-selling can partly be a response to this increase in competition.
For answering these questions we allow for the number of banks to be endogenous (i.e. we look at the
long run solution of the monopolistic competition model) and we then investigate the impact of competition
(modelled as a decrease in transportation costs) on the pro￿tability of services.
By substituting into expected pro￿ts the optimal level of screening and the optimal interest rate and by









As it is standard in this type of monopolistic competition models, the number of ￿rms, at equilibrium, is
positively related to transportation costs (larger transportation costs increase the banks￿monopoly power,
thus increasing pro￿ts, for a given number of banks, and inducing more entry) and it is negatively related to
the ￿xed cost of installation K. Moreover, in this model, the equilibrium number of ￿rms increases with the
equilibrium expected number of successful projects B(e￿) (this is because the higher is the expected number
of successful projects the higher are pro￿ts inducing more entry) and decreases with the average success
probability p (this is because the higher is the average success probability the higher is the sensitivity of
demand to interest rate di⁄erentials and the lower is the short run equilibrium interest rate, thus leading to
lower pro￿ts and less entry).
We can now look at the impact of increasing competition in the lending market (a decrease in the para-






A[e￿(r￿(￿))]psvsS ￿ K (8)
where the number of banks is given by (7). Equation (8) shows that the pro￿tability of services increases
with the selection ratio and the expected revenue from services and decreases with the number of banks and
with the ￿xed installation costs. In particular the higher is the selection ratio and the lower is the equilibrium
number of banks, the higher is the number of customers for each bank and, since the bank has a positive
probability of selling services to its customers, the higher is the expected pro￿tability of the cross-selling
activity. An increase in competition in the lending market a⁄ects the expected pro￿tability of services via
several channels. First, by a⁄ecting the equilibrium screening e⁄ort (through the interest rate) it a⁄ects
the selection ratio; second it has both a direct and an indirect (through the screening e⁄ort) impact on the
equilibrium number of banks (see equation 10). In order to compute the overall impact of competition on






























Corollary 4 Whenever the expected ratio of successful projects is increasing in the screening e⁄ort (B0(e￿) >
0) an increase in competition in the lending market (a decrease in transportation costs ￿) increases the
expected pro￿tability of services. Otherwise (B0(e￿) < 0) an increase in competition decreases the expected
pro￿tability of services for high levels of transportation costs but, as transportation costs continue to decrease,
the expected pro￿tability of services eventually rises.
Proof. See Appendix B.
What is the explanation for this result? Since in the model the pro￿tability of services per loan customer is
￿xed, everything depends on whether with more competition a bank has more or less loan customers. This
depends on how competition a⁄ects the equilibrium number of banks and the selection ratio (see Table 3).
As it is standard in this type of models, an increase in competition (a decrease in transportation costs)
leads to lower pro￿ts and less entry. Moreover, in our model, a decrease in transportation costs reduces the
equilibrium number of banks also through the expected number of successful projects7.
While competition always reduces the equilibrium number of banks, the impact on the selection ratio
depends on how the interest rate a⁄ects the equilibrium screening e⁄ort (which depends on the sign of
7In fact the lower long run interest rate associated with a lower level of transportation costs induces banks to choose the
level of e⁄ort so that the expected number of successful projects is decreased thus leading to a lower equilibrium number of
banks (see equation 7).
16B0(e￿)) and on how the screening e⁄ort a⁄ects the selection ratio (the sign of A0(e￿)) (see Table 3). However,
also when competition reduces the selection ratio (i.e. when B0(e￿) and A0(e￿) have the same sign: cases
b1 and b2 in Table 3), the negative impact on the equilibrium number of banks either prevails (this is
the case when B0(e￿) > 0 and A0(e￿) > 0), or prevails for su¢ ciently low levels of transportation costs:




B0(e￿)A0(e￿) (this is the case when B0(e￿) < 0 and A0(e￿) < 0)(see Appendix B).
Table 3 The impact of competition on the expected pro￿tability of services
Partial impact on ￿e
S Total impact on ￿e
S
a) Impact on n￿: ￿ # n￿ # ￿e
S "
b) Impact on A(e￿)
b1) A0(e￿) > 0; B0(e￿) > 0: ￿ # r￿ # e￿ # A(e￿) # ￿e
S # a) prevails
b2) A0(e￿) < 0; B0(e￿) < 0: ￿ # r￿ # e￿ " A(e￿) # ￿e
S # a) prevails for ￿ < ￿cr
b3) A0(e￿) < 0; B0(e￿) > 0: ￿ # r￿ # e￿ # A(e￿) " ￿e
S " a) and b) have the same sign
In this model more competition in the lending market between existing banks, by reducing expected pro￿ts
from lending, leads to a more concentrated banking system. Competition also a⁄ects lending (the number of
positively evaluated borrowers) in a way that depends on the composition and heterogeneity of the project
pool. However for su¢ ciently low levels of transportation costs, an increase in competition leads to a higher
number of each bank￿ s loan customers, thus increasing the expected pro￿tability of services.
This result is consistent with the view that the transition to a marketing orientation in banking docu-
mented in the literature is, at least in part, a response to increasing competition in the lending market.
5 Extensions and empirical implications
5.1 The case of information synergies
We now complicate the model by assuming the existence of some synergies in the production of services and
information through the screening activity. First, the larger is the range of services sold by the bank, the
17lower is the marginal cost of producing information. This is because by selling services the bank acquires
some information on the borrower￿ s type. In particular we are assuming that it is less costly to produce
information when services are also produced so that: C = C(e;S) with @C=@S < 0 and @2C=@e@S < 0.
Banks, by selling services, acquire some information on the characteristics of the borrowers that they can use
to improve the e¢ ciency of the screening activity. This is a ￿rst source of complementarity between screening
and cross-selling activities. A second source of complementarity derives from the impact that information
collected through the screening activity can have on the probability of selling a service other than a loan. In
particular, we assume that ps = ps(e) with @ps=@e > 0 and @2ps=@e2 < 0.
The interdependence between screening and cross-selling activities may be very important in order to
increase bank e¢ ciency. We shall see that if banks are able to create information synergies between the
screening and the cross-selling activities, cross-selling is less likely to reduce the optimal screening e⁄ort. In










[B(e)r ￿ A(e)(rf ￿ ps(e)vsS) ￿ C(e;S)] ￿ K (11)












In the presence of synergies, the positive impact of screening on the probability of selling services leads to
a higher marginal expected bene￿t of screening with respect to the case without synergies, and, all other
things being equal, to a higher equilibrium screening e⁄ort.











where jJj > 0; [A0(e￿)B(e￿) ￿ B0(e￿)A(e￿)] < 0; B(e￿)A(e￿)vs(@ps=@e) > 0; B(e￿)(@2C=@e@S) < 0 and
B0(e￿)(@C=@S) 7 0 if B0(e￿) ? 0:
18Corollary 5 In the case of synergies the impact of cross-selling on the optimal screening e⁄ort is positive
whenever B(e￿)A(e￿)vs(@ps=@e) ￿ B(e￿)(@2C=@e@S) + B0(e￿)(@C=@S) > psvs[B0(e￿)A(e￿) ￿ A0(e￿)B(e￿)]
This is more likely to happen the higher is the impact of screening on the probability of selling services
(that increases the marginal bene￿t of screening) and the higher is the negative impact of services on the
marginal cost of screening. Finally the lower cost of screening makes it more likely to have a positive impact
of cross-selling on screening when B0(e￿) is negative8.
In general, while in the absence of synergies between the cross-selling and the screening activities, cross-
selling always reduces screening, when the bank is able to exploit information synergies it becomes less
probable that an increase in services induces the bank to decrease its screening e⁄ort.
Corollary 6 When there are enough synergies between the screening and the cross-selling activities so that
the impact of services on the optimal screening e⁄ort is positive, lending increases in good periods and
decreases in bad periods.
Information synergies may allow to overcome the negative impact of cross-selling on screening incentives,
thus increasing the quality of the pool of ￿nanced projects.
In the extended model the consequences of the bank￿ s cross-selling activity on the traditional activity
of screening loan applicants depend on the degree of information synergies between services and loans. In
particular services could be classi￿ed according to the extent of interdependence between screening and
cross-selling captured by the two parameters @ps=@e and @2C(e;S)=@e@S, i.e the impact of screening on the
probability of selling a service and the size of economies of scope between the production of information and
services (see Table 4).
In the ￿rst row we ￿nd those services for which the screening activity is supposed to be important.
The collection of information by the bank can increase the probability of selling those services that are
8This is because as services increase screening costs decrease and so does the equilibrium interest rate (see equation 5) with a
positive impact on the equilibrium screening e⁄ort when the expected number of successful projects decreases with the screening
e⁄ort.
19customer-speci￿c, i.e. are bought by customers on the basis of their personal characteristics: for example
the bank, by increasing the screening e⁄ort (i.e. by carefully studying an investment project), can acquire
some information on the propensity to risk of the borrower that can be useful for inducing the customer to
sign some insurance contracts. To a lesser extent this information can also be used by the bank for selling
to the customer mutual funds with the ￿right￿risk characteristics.
In the ￿rst column we ￿nd services that are highly informative, in the sense that they provide the bank
with some information that can be useful for the screening activity: selling those services to a customer
can lower screening costs and increase screening e¢ ciency. This can be the case, for example, of deposits
that are characterised by a low degree of customer speci￿city (second row, ￿rst column) but can provide
precious information on the amount of resources available to the borrower. Some services are at the same
time customer-speci￿c and highly informative (￿rst row and ￿rst column). This is the case of insurance: not
only the service is customer-speci￿c so that information acquired through the screening activity can enhance
the probability of selling the insurance, but it is also informative. The fact that the borrower has signed
some types of insurance contracts can provide the bank with valuable information on the risk of the project,
thus lowering the cost of screening. Insurance is, therefore, a category of services with potentially important
synergies with the lending activity of banks. In the last years in Europe a growing number of banks have
entered the insurance market, also by cross-sector consolidation, and several empirical studies suggest that
￿bankassurance￿may also help risk diversi￿cation (see ECB, 2005).
It is also important to observe that the degree of interdependence between the screening and the cross-
selling activities depends, not only on the characteristics of the service, but also on the ability of the bank to
use e¢ ciently the information collected. The same service, e.g. insurance, can be o⁄ered together with loans
by a bank in a simple cross-selling activity, with no exchange of information between loans and insurance
services, or as a fully integrated product where the bank makes extensive use of information about the
customer (Van den Berghe, Verweire and Carchon, 1999). In our model the two modalities have very
di⁄erent implications for the impact of cross-selling on the screening activity.
20Table 4 A tentative classi￿cation of services based on information synergies
Impact of screening on the Impact of services on the marginal cost of screening
probability of selling a service
High Low
High Customer-speci￿c highly-informative Customer-speci￿c not highly informative
services (e.g. life/health insurance) services (e.g. non ￿nancial personal services)
Low Highly-informative not Not highly informative nor
customer-speci￿c services customer-speci￿c services
(e.g. payment services) (e.g. auto insurance)
5.2 Empirical Implications
Our model predicts that when there are no synergies between the screening and cross-selling activities,
the increase in services leads to a decrease in the equilibrium screening e⁄ort. While we are not aware of
any empirical work directly investigating this issue, the result is consistent with the evidence that small
banks, having a smaller range of services to sell when compared to large banks, are more likely to engage in
relationship lending (see for example Berlin and Mester, 1998 and Cole, Goldberg and White, 1999). Small
banks in Europe tend to localise where the degree of asymmetric information is higher (A¢ nito and Piazza,
2005). Consistently with our model, this could derive by the choice of large banks, supplying a large range of
services other than loans, to perform a low level of screening, su¢ cient at achieving only public information
about a ￿rm, information that is available only for the more transparent typologies of ￿rms. Small banks,
on the opposite, whose pro￿ts derive almost exclusively from intermediation, choose to perform a level of
screening su¢ cient at achieving private information about ￿rms and, therefore, are able to grant loans also
to opaque ￿rms (Berger et al. 2005).
Other indirect evidence consistent with the results of our model can be found in the empirical research on
the impact of banks￿diversi￿cation on risk. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) ￿nd that while there is no signi￿cant
relationship between the average level of pro￿ts and either diversi￿cation or non-interest share, an increased
21reliance on non-interest income is associated with more volatile pro￿ts. Furthermore they ￿nd a strong
negative correlation between risk-adjusted performance and non-interest share of revenues. The authors
explain this result with the high volatility of non-interest income, however it cannot be excluded that the
result, consistently with our model, depends on a decrease in the lenders￿screening e⁄ort.
Furthermore Le Petit et al. (2007) show that European banks which have expanded into non-interest
activities present a higher level of risk than banks which mainly perform traditional intermediation activities.
In order to test for a possible cross-selling behaviour of interest and non-interest products they analyse the
determinants of the risk premium charged by banks and they ￿nd that borrowers￿default risk is underpriced
in lending rates by banks having large fee based activities.
Another prediction of our model is that a decrease in transportation costs (that can be interpreted as an
increase in competition between existing banks due for example to ICT developments and more transparency
in the banking sector) leads to a more concentrated banking sector and to an increase in banks￿expected
pro￿tability from o⁄ering services other than loans. This is consistent with the evidence that banks have
responded to increasing competition in the lending market by partly shifting from more traditional lending
activities to other services. In fact in the US, while at the beginning of the Nineties spread income accounted
for about 80% of bank earnings, at the end of the Nineties most of large banks earn more than half of
their income from fees and trading income (Allen and Santomero, 2001). In Europe during the Nineties
the progressive liberalisation of entry conditions to local banking markets fostered the emergence of new
intermediaries challenging the position of incumbent banks. European banks are reacting to these pressure
on pro￿tability by diversifying income sources￿ : while in 1997 non-interest revenues accounted for 33% of
total revenues, in 2003 the ratio reached a level higher than 40% (ECB, 2004). At the end of the Nineties
also the Italian banking system, which in the past was characterised by a very low degree of competition,
experienced a similar evolution. In June 2000 the Italian Banking Association (ABI, Associazione Bancaria
Italiana) reported that in 1999 for the ￿rst time revenues from services, dividends and other proceeds exceeded
returns deriving from traditional intermediation activity for 91 among the ￿rst 130 Italian banks and more
recent data con￿rm this trend.
22In our model the consequence of this shift in banks￿activity towards the provision of services di⁄erent
from loans is the reduction in the traditional role of banks as providers of information about borrowers.
This result may be reversed in the presence of information synergies between screening and cross-selling.
The empirical evidence on the exploitation of information synergies by banks is still very limited. Van
den Berghe, Verweire and Carchon (1999), studying banks cross-selling activities, ￿nd that the use of fully
integrated services with a high degree of exchange of information between di⁄erent ￿nancial services is more
the exception than the rule. Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2007) report evidence for a Canadian bank that
checking account information lowers screening costs, also if they recognise that synergies can be exploited
only when the borrower has an exclusive relationship with the bank, and this occurs very rarely in Europe
for large banks (see Ongena and Smith, 2000). According to Frei, Harker and Hunter (1998) it may be
di¢ cult for banks to exploit information synergies since banks collect and process information by product
and transaction and not by customer.
In the context of increasingly competitive ￿nancial markets, the empirical evidence, although very limited,
suggesting that the exploitation of information synergies between screening and cross-selling is not yet so
developed, raises some concern on the impact of banks￿income diversi￿cation on their screening e⁄ort.
However the transformation of the banking sector might lead to the development of new technologies allowing
banks to exploit the potential synergies between the screening and the cross-selling activities. According
to Berger, Frame and Miller (2005) and Berger, Rosen and Udell (2005) transaction technologies exist that
may be used to supply funding to very opaque ￿rms even when relationship lending cannot be e⁄ectively
employed. The results of the model presented in this paper suggest that it is crucial for banks to exploit these
technologies if they want to maintain their traditional role of producers of information about borrowers.
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined the impact of cross-selling on the banks￿optimal screening e⁄ort. We have found
that, when there are no information synergies between the cross-selling and the screening activity, cross-
23selling reduces the optimal screening e⁄ort. This result can cause some concern since it implies that the
more the banking system evolves towards non traditional activities, the less will be information based credit,
with a negative in￿ uence on the quality of the pool of investment projects ￿nanced. In our model revenues
from cross-selling may induce banks to be lazy and to screen loan applicants insu¢ ciently. However the
existence of some elements of interdependence between the cross-selling and the screening activities makes
the trade-o⁄ between cross-selling and screening less likely.
In our view the recent years￿proliferation of transaction oriented banking, that has started to seriously
challenge banks￿future as relationship lenders, may have been induced by the growing importance of cross-
selling strategies but we suggest that the role of information synergies may be crucial in reverting this trend:
more cross-selling could be associated to more ￿relationship lending￿and more production of information.
Boot (2000) de￿nes as a ￿relationship lender￿the lender who evaluates the pro￿tability of an investment in
the acquisition of customer speci￿c information through multiple interactions with the same customer across
di⁄erent products (and/or over time).
Our model has shown that, for su¢ ciently low levels of transportation costs, an increase in competition
in the lending market increases the pro￿tability of services. This is consistent with the view that capital
market liberalization and the growing integration of ￿nancial markets, by increasing competition in the
lending market, may contribute explaining the transition of banks towards non traditional service activities.
This transition, according to our model, will bring to the progressive weakening of the Schumpeterian role
of banks in fostering economic growth unless banks will be able to exploit information synergies between
screening and cross-selling.
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[B(e￿)r￿ ￿ A(e￿)(rf ￿ psvsS) ￿ C(e￿)] +
1
n
B(e￿) = 0 (A2)






































with Fee < 09, Frr < 0 and we assume FeeFrr ￿ Fer > 0 for the stability of the symmetric equilibrium (this

























￿[B00(e￿)r￿ ￿ A00(e￿)(rf ￿ psvs) ￿ C00(e￿)]B(e￿) ￿ (￿=pn)[B0(e￿)]2 < 0 (A4)
The numerator in (A4) is negative: note that A0(e￿)B(e￿) ￿ B0(e￿)A(e￿) = ￿Q0(e￿)[A(e￿)]
2 < 0, since
when the screening e⁄ort increases, also the quality of the project pool increases. The denominator must be
9B00(e￿)r￿ ￿A00(e￿)(rf ￿psvsS)￿C00(e￿) = ￿00(e￿)￿(phr￿ +psvsS ￿rf)+￿00(e￿)(1￿￿)(plr￿ +psvsS ￿rf)￿C00(e￿) with
￿00(e￿) ￿ 0, ￿00(e￿) ￿ 0, C00(e￿) > 0, (phr￿ + psvsS ￿ rf) > 0 and (plr￿ + psvsS ￿ rf) < 0
10Note that jJj di⁄ers from the determinant of the Hessian matrix since the Jacobian is derived for a system in which we
have imposed the symmetric solution ri = r0.
25positive for the stability of the symmetric equilibrium, therefore as services increase the equilibrium screening
e⁄ort decreases (Corollary 1).
In order to guarantee the positivity of the denominator in (A4) we assume a su¢ ciently low level of
transportation costs:
￿ <
￿[B00(e￿)r￿ ￿ A00(e￿)(rf ￿ psvs) ￿ C00(e￿)]B(e￿)
B0(e￿)2 np (A5)
26Appendix B
In order to compute the overall impact of competition on the expected pro￿tability of services we di⁄er-














































The impact of competition on the optimal screening e⁄ort can be obtained by applying Cramer￿ s rule to the
system of equations that implicitly de￿ne the optimal screening e⁄ort and the optimal interest rate in the

















B(e￿) = 0 (B5)















































￿2pn￿[B00(e￿)r￿ ￿ A00(e￿)(rf ￿ psvsS) ￿ C00(e￿)]B(e￿) ￿ ￿B0(e￿)2 (B6)


































A(e￿)[B00(e￿)r￿ ￿ A00(e￿)(rf ￿ psvsS) ￿ C00(e￿)] +
1
n￿A0(e￿)B0(e￿) < 0 (B9)
The ￿rst term in equation (B9) is negative while the sign of the second term depends on the sign of the
product between A0(e￿) and B0(e￿) and it is also negative when the two terms have opposite signs. Otherwise




B0(e￿)A0(e￿) = ￿crwhere jFeej denotes the absolute value
of the derivative with respect to the screening e⁄ort of the ￿rst order condition for the screening e⁄ort
calculated at the symmetric equilibrium. This is similar to the condition for the stability of the symmetric




B0(e￿)2 . When B0(e￿) > 0 if the condition for the stability of the symmetric
equilibrium is satis￿ed also (B9) is satis￿ed. In fact:















and the di⁄erence is positive with B0(e￿) > 0 since, when A0(e￿) and B0(e￿) have the same sign, the expression
in square brackets is positive. We are therefore left with only one case in which competition can lower the
pro￿tability of services, i.e. the case in which A0(e￿) < 0 and B0(e￿) < 0: In this case there is a range
of transportation costs ￿ > ￿cr for which a decrease in transportation costs (an increase in competition)
leads to a decrease in the expected pro￿tability of services, but as transportation costs continue to fall, the
expected pro￿tability of services will eventually increase also in this case.
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